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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-KNOCK AND
ANNOUNCE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT KNOCKS AND THE SUPREME COURT
ANNOUNCES A RE-EMPHASIS ON THE CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS. United
States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, courts have struggled to balance the needs of law en-
forcement with individuals' rights of privacy.' Increasingly in today's soci-
ety, courts are willing to promote law enforcement interests in pursuing
crime investigation and prevention, particularly with the war on drugs and,
more recently, the war on terror.2 On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides protection for citizens against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 3 Since mid-century, when the first
knock and announce case came before the Court, the United States Supreme
Court, as well as lower courts everywhere, have struggled to balance law
enforcement interests with individuals' rights of privacy.4 The Court began
by using 18 U.S.C. § 31095 to require officers to knock and announce their
presence before entering a person's home. 6 Over the years, the Court con-
tinued to rule on the issue, deciding that the Reasonableness Clause of the
Fourth Amendment determined whether an entry was constitutionally per-
nissible.7 Although the Court eventually settled on a standard, it used sev-
eral different standards before choosing, at least for now, "reasonable suspi-
cion" as the standard that police must meet before entering a residence
without consent.
8
1. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963).
2. See generally Craig Hemnens, I Hear You Knocking: The Supreme Court Revisits
the Knock and Announce Rule, 66 UMKC L. REV. 559, 566-68 (1998).
3. The Fourth Amendment ofi the United States Constitution states.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See infra Part III.
5. The federal statute, which is typical of most state statutes, states:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after no-
tice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part IIl.C, E.
8. See infra Part 111.
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As courts struggle to interpret the Supreme Court's rulings, situations
arise daily that present new circumstances and new applications of the "rea-
sonable suspicion" standard.9 United States v. Banks is the most recent case
to come before the United States Supreme Court involving the knock and
announce requirement. 10 In Banks, the Supreme Court addressed when offi-
cers can legitimately have a reasonable suspicion of necessity to enter a
home after a knock and announcement but without a refusal of admittance."
Banks attempts to answer the complex question of how long officers must
wait after announcing their presence before forcibly entering a residence.
12
While the Court continued to require a case-by-case analysis in determining
the reasonableness of a search, Banks illustrates the amount of time that the
Constitution may require under certain circumstances."
This note explores the Supreme Court's application of the knock and
announce rule through the case of United States v. Banks, a decision that
attempts to clarify the waiting time necessary for police entry. 4 First, the
note gives a brief overview of the facts involved in Banks.15 Then, in the
background section, the note traces the origin of the knock and announce
rule and the benefits derived from the rule.' 6 The note then focuses on the
prior knock and announce cases reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court dating back to 1958 and how each case helped to classify and define
the rule. ' 7 Next, the note explains the reasoning of the Court in deciding
Banks and then explores the practical effect of Banks on the application of
the knock and announce rule.' 8 In the significance section, the note dis-
cusses the difficulty that police officers, lower courts, and citizens will have
applying Banks to each particular situation and suggests that the Arkansas
Supreme Court may extend state constitutional standards to provide more
protection of the home than the United States Constitution provides.' 9
II. FACTS
On July 8, 1998, officers from the North Las Vegas Police Department
obtained a warrant to search an apartment in Las Vegas, Nevada for sus-
9. See infra Part III.F-H, IV.
10. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
11. See id. at 34.
12. Id. at 35.
13. Id. at 31.
14. Id. at 34-35.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B-H.
18. See infra Part IV-V.
19. See infra Part V.
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pected drug activity.20 The officers had received information from an infor-pectd dug ativty.21
mant that a person named "Shakes" was selling drugs at his apartment.
The informant offered to attempt a controlled buy at Shakes' apartment,22
which police knew to be a small, two-bedroom unit.23 The officers searched
the informant for money and drugs and then provided him with the neces-
sary money to make the purchase.24 The informant entered the apartment
and returned with two large off-white rocks of cocaine, which he said he
had purchased from Shakes.25
On July 15, 1998 around 2 p.m.,26 a state and federal drug task force
27
executed a search warrant 28 for cocaine and drug paraphernalia at the home
of Lashawn Lowell Banks in North Las Vegas, Nevada. 29 A SWAT team
was located at the entrance to the apartment,30 while other officers were
positioned at the rear of the apartment. 3' The entry team knocked on the
door and loudly announced "police search warrant" in compliance with the
statutory knock and announce requirement.3 2 The officers in the back of the
apartment could hear the team located at the entrance to the apartment.
33
-learing no response from inside the apartment, the officers waited fifteen to
twenty seconds and then forcibly entered the apartment.34
20. Respondent's Brief at 4, United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (No. 02-473).
The warrant described the apartment as an upstairs apartment in a four-apartment building.
Id.
21. /d. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (No. 02-
473).
24. Respondent's Brief at 3, Banks (No. 02-473). The North Las Vegas Police Depart-
ment gave the informant $200 from the narcotics buy fund and then drove him to the address
he had provided. Id.
25. Id.
26. Brief for the United States at 3, Banks (No. 02-473).
27. Respondent's Brief at 3, Banks (No. 02-473). The team consisted of Las Vegas
Police Department officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Brief for the United
States at 3, Banks (No. 02-473).
28. The state court issued the warrant. Brief for the United States at 3, Banks (No. 02-
473).
29. Id. Banks was the sole occupant of the apartment at the time of the execution of the
warrant. Respondent's Brief at 5, Banks (No. 02-473).
30. Respondent's Brief at 4, Banks (No. 02-473). The team at the front door was armed
with fully automatic weaponry, and members of the SWAT team were wearing "tactical
assault garb," including hoods or masks. Id.
31. United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 705.
34. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003). The officers used a battering ram on
the front door to force their way into the apartment. Id. Respondent's Brief asserts that the
officer stated that he waited "at least 15 seconds" before ramming open the door while the
other officer located at the rear of the apartment said "I think twenty seconds, maybe." Re-
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The officers entered the apartment to find Banks "wet, soapy and na-
ked" in the hallway a few steps from the bathroom. 35 He was forced to the
floor, handcuffed and taken to the kitchen table for questioning.36 Banks
stated that he had not heard the announcement because he was in the
shower, but that he heard a loud boom that prompted him to step out of the
shower where he was thrown to the floor by an unidentified, armed man.
37
During his interrogation, 38 the SWAT team searched his apartment where
they found evidence, including drugs and weapons.39
Banks' defense counsel filed a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence,
including the statements made during the interrogation. 40 His arguments
included that the police obtained the statements (1) in violation of the fed-
eral knock and announce statute because the officers did not wait a reason-
able time before forcing their way into his apartment; (2) "in violation of the
[F]ifth [A]mendment because he did not make a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his rights during the interrogation;" and (3) in violation of the
Fifth Amendment because the questioning continued after he requested an
attorney.41 The district court denied the suppression motion, and Banks
plead guilty while reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of
his motion to suppress.42
spondent's Brief at 4, Banks (No. 02-473).
35. Respondent's Brief at 4, Banks (No. 02-473).
36. Banks, 282 F.3d at 702. The officers gave Banks underwear to cover himself shortly
thereafter. Id.
37. Respondent's Brief at 4, Banks (No. 02-473). Banks stated that he did not know
whether the man who threw him to the floor was a police officer or a robber. Id.
38. Banks claimed that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs during the inter-
rogation and that he was "nervous and intimidated" by the police officers during the ques-
tioning. Banks, 282 F.3d at 702. He attributed this nervousness in part to the "good-cop"
versus "bad-cop" routine used by the officers as well as to the SWAT officers searching the
apartment. Id. The officers, however, said that there were no indications that he was under
the influence of anything or that he was nervous during the interview. Id. Instead, they said
he appeared calm and "was able to reason" throughout the questioning. Id. About halfway
through the approximately forty-five minute interrogation, the officers questioned Banks
about his suppliers. Id. He refused to reveal his suppliers without first talking to his attorney,
but the officers continued the questioning. Id. Banks was subsequently arrested. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 5, United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-10439).
39. Banks, 540 U.S. at 33; Respondent's Brief at 5, Banks (No. 02-473). The evidence
found included a .38 caliber semi-automatic pistol with a laser sight and seven rounds in the
magazine, a .40 caliber semi-automatic pistol, a .22 caliber Beretta pistol, a bullet-proof vest,
a scale, $6000 in cash, and eleven ounces of crack cocaine. Brief for the United States at 4,
Banks (No. 02-473).
40. Banks, 282 F.3d at 703.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 703. He plead guilty to "possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute and to being a drug user in possession of a firearm." Id.
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On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
a split panel reversed on the knock and announce issue and ordered suppres-
sion of the evidence.43 The court classified entries into the following four
distinct categories to help in the determination of what is reasonable under
the circumstances:
(1) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is
possible, permitting entry to be made simultaneously with or shortly af-
ter announcement; (2) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and
forced entry by destruction of property is required, necessitating more
specific inferences of exigenicy; (3) entries in which no exigent circum-
stances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, requiring an explicit re-
fusal of admittance or a lapse of a significant amount of time; and (4)
entries in which no exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by de-
struction of property is required, mandating an explicit refusal of admit-
tance or a lapse of an even more substantial amount of time.
44
The court focused on when a reasonable waiting time would constitute a
denial of admittance and listed factors an officer should consider in making
an entry without an explicit denial.45
As for Banks, the court of appeals found no exigent circumstances or
affirmative denial of admission and, therefore, reversed and remanded the
case, holding that the fifteen to twenty second waiting period was not "suf-
ficient in duration to satisfy the constitutional safeguards." ' 6 One judge dis-
sented, saying that the factors used by the court, including time of day, the
small apartment, and the loud announcement, indicated that fifteen to
twenty seconds was enough to support "a reasonable inference that admit-
tance had been constructively denied."A7 The United States appealed, and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorai.
48
43. Banks, 540 U.S. at 34.
44. Banks, 282 F.3d at 704. The court put Banks' search in the last category because the
officers destroyed the door without first hearing a refusal to admit. Id.
45. Id. These factors include the following: (a) size of residence; (b) location of resi-
dence; (c) location of officers in relation to main living or sleeping areas; (d) time of day; (e)
nature of suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect's guilt; (g) suspect's
prior convictions and the type of offenses; (h) any other observations "triggering the senses
of the officers that reasonably would lead one to believe that immediate entry was neces-
sary." Id.
46. See id. at 704-06. The court rejected Banks' other two Fifth Amendment arguments,
which were not at issue on appeal to the Supreme Court. See id. at 705-06.
47. Banks, 540 U.S. at 34.
48. Id.
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III. BACKGROUND
The background section begins with an examination of the history and
basic principles of the knock and announce rule.49 The section discusses the
first knock and announce case to reach the Supreme Court and the Court's
use of the federal statute for guidance in the states. 0 The section then details
the origins of the blanket and particularized approaches used across the na-
tion and the subsequent problems that arose because of these varying ap-
proaches. 5' Also discussed is the proper application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the knock and announce rule and their combined application in the
52states. Finally, the section examines the most recent knock and announce
case reviewed by the Supreme Court and its impact on the progression of
the knock and announce rule. 3
A. The Basic Requirements of Knock and Announce and Its Origin
The knock and announce rule requires police officers executing a
search warrant at a residence to announce their presence and authority be-
fore the officers forcibly enter the home. 4 In general, a police officer is
required to identify herself as a police officer, demand entry, inform the
occupants of the legal basis for entry, and give the occupants an opportunity
to cooperate by allowing entry.55 Although some scholars disagree,5 6 the
rule has been said to serve the following three purposes: (1) it lessens the
potential for violence, whereas an unannounced entry into a home could
cause the resident to fear for his safety and take defensive measures; (2) it
helps protect privacy by lowering the chances that the police might enter the
wrong premises as well as allowing residents a brief time to prepare for
49. See infra Part III.A.
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See infra Part III.C, F.
52. See infra Part III.E.
53. See infra Part 11I.G.
54. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (recognizing that the common law
requirements of search and seizure include the requirement that a law enforcement officer
generally must first announce his presence and authority before breaking open the doors of a
dwelling).
55. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE VOL. 1, § 3.6(b) (1984) (stating
that this requirement applies to entry by force, a pass key, opening an unlocked door, and in
some circumstances, to passage through an already open door, but not to entry by ruse be-
cause such activity does not intrude on the noted purposes of the requirement). The police
must make an announcement so that the occupants can reasonably be expected to hear it; a
whisper would not be appropriate. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1958).
56. Michael R. Sonnenreich & Stanley Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged
Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 626, 647 (1969) (stating that it "is difficult to
see what actual protection is given to any right of privacy by the announcement rule").
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police entry and avoid shock or embarrassment;5 7 and (3) it prevents need-
less destruction of property by allowing the resident the opportunity to al-
low the officers to enter the residence.58 The knock and announce rule is
intended to make entry as peaceful and nondestructive as possible under the
circumstances, not to prevent police entry. 59
A seventeenth century English case, Semayne's Case, is the most
commonly cited source of the common law knock and announce rule, al-
though Semayne's Case itself indicates that the rule may be traced back to a
thirteenth century statute affirming the common law.6° In its earliest days,
the common law limited police officers' authority to break into a house for
an arrest because this action invaded the individual's privacy. 61 The re-
quirements stated in Semayne's Case are now reflected in 18 U.S.C. §
3109,62 in the statutes of many states, 63 and in state constitutional provisions
incorporating English common law.64 These state statutes requiring notice
and announcement also generally codify the common law exceptions to the
rule, although both the federal statute and some state statutes do not ex-
pressly mention them.65 The exceptions, however, have evolved with the
common law rule and include exceptions for danger to the officer, possible
destruction of evidence, and potential escape of the suspect.66
57. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 57 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.8 (3d ed. 1996).
59. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 184.
60. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932 n.2 (1995); Loly Garcia Tor, Note, Mandat-
ing Exclusion for Violations of the Knock and Announce Rule, 83 B.U. L. REV. 853, 855
(2003) (stating that "the knock and announce rule has a long history and deep roots in Anglo-
American jurisprudence").
61. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (explaining that breaking into a house for an
arrest "invades the precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's
house is his castle").
62. See supra note 5; Miller, 357 U.S. at 308; LAFAVE, supra note 58, at 598.
63. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933 (giving a list of state statutes); LAFAVE, supra note 58,
at 598; Hemmens, supra note 2, at 566-68 (detailing the progression of common law knock
and announce through England and into American colonial times).
64. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 933.
65. See LAFAVE, supra note 58, at 598; G. Robert Blakey, The Rule of Announcement
and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499,
504-05 (1964) (listing many common law qualifications that were widely adopted and giving
a lengthy discussion of this development in early American case law); Hemmens, supra note
2, at 568.
66. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 569.
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B. The Knock and Announce Rule in a State of Confusion: Miller v.
United States
The United States did not address the issue of unannounced entry until
1958 in the case of Miller v. United States.67 In Miller, the defendant asked,
"Who's there?" after heaing a knock n the do&v at 3A5 a.m.68 hx tesp4anse,
the police, without a search or arrest warrant, answered softly "the police.,
69
Miller opened the door slightly, leaving the chain on the door, and at-
tempted to close the door when she realized it was the police. 70 The police
forced their way in, broke the chain, and proceeded to search the apartment,
finding evidence used at trial against Miller.7 '
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, determined that
the entry was unlawful because the police did not first expressly announce
their presence and purpose. Local statute and the common law required
this knock and announcement, but the court declared and the Government
agreed that the requirement was to be tested by the standard in 18 U.S.C. §
31039. 71 Suslice B~rennan noted that some situations iouald not reTquir an-
nouncement because the police would be "virtually certain" that the resident
knew of their presence and purpose.74 Although the Court acknowledged
that the common law exceptions existed, it did not address them because
they were not at issue in that case.75 After Miller, state courts were still free
to decide such cases based on state law while federal courts were left trying
to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3 109.76 This resulted in various interpretations in
state and federal courts.
7 7
67. Miller, 357 U.S. at 301; Hemmens, supra note 2, at 569.
68. Miller, 357 U.S. at 303-04.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 303-04.
72. Id. at 309-10.
73. Id. at 302, 306-07, 309-10. It is interesting to note that the court could have decided
the issue on a number of grounds with varying consequences including the Fourth Amend-
ment, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or state procedure. Blakey,
supra note 65, at 519-24 (discussing the possible approaches and their consequences).
74. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 310 (1958).
75. Id. at 309.
76. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 570-71.
77. Id.; see also Blakey, supra note 65, at 527 (stating that the federal courts have "dis-
agreed, moreover, on some of the most fundamental aspects of the Court's decision"). The
article also gives a lengthy discussion of various federal and state interpretations and deci-
sions, pointing out that California all but ignored the Supreme Court's ruling in deciding
state cases. Id. at 531-32.
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C. Another Try at Clarification: Ker v. California
The plurality opinion in Ker v. California78 aptly illustrates the confu-
sion both by courts nationwide and the Justices of the Supreme Court as to
search and seizure cases. 79 In Ker, the police entered the defendant's apart-
ment without notice or announcement, relying on their belief that Ker would
destroy evidence if he knew the police were coming to search the apart-
ment.80 Although the Court did not expressly hold that the Fourth Amend-
ment included the common law knock and announce requirement, it did
hold that courts should judge the circumstances of entry by the Reasonable-
ness Clause of the Fourth Amendment. 81 The eight justices agreed that cer-
tain circumstances would warrant an entry without a knock and announce-
ment, but they split evenly on the particular circumstances in which this
would be justified. 82
Justice Clark's opinion held that courts should allow the police to ig-
nore the knock and announce requirement when exigent circumstances war-
rant.83 Although the opinion did not specify when these circumstances
would be present, it focused on the facts in Ker, which included a belief by
the officers that Ker had narcotics that could be quickly and easily de-
stroyed.84 With Justice Harlan's concurrence in the result, differing in that
he based his decision on the Fourteenth Amendment and "fundamental fair-
ness" rather than on the plurality's Fourth Amendment and Reasonableness
Clause analysis, the Court upheld Ker's conviction.85
Justice Brennan's dissent, however, found that the police were not jus-
tified in entering the apartment without the proper announcement. 86 He ar-
gued that the knock and announce rule was part of the Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment based on the common law at the time of
the framing of the Bill of Rights.87 Justice Brennan further stated that the
78. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
79. Blakey, supra note 65, at 539. The five part opinion includes various combinations
of the Justices agreeing and disagreeing with each part, finally arriving at a plurality opinion
written by Justice Clark with a dissent led by Justice Brennan. Ker, 374 U.S. at 24, 44, 46.
80. Ker, 374 U.S. at 40. The officers gained entrance to Ker's apartment from a pass
key obtained from the manager of the apartment. Id. at 28.
81. Ker, 374 U.S. at 33; see also Hemmens, supra note 2, at 571.
82. Ker, 374 U.S. 23; Hemmens, supra note 2, at 571-72.
83. Ker, 374 U.S. at 40-41. Justice Clark reasoned that the entry fell within an excep-
tion that the California courts had added to California's knock and announce statute. Id. at
37-39.
84. Id. at 40-41.
85. Id. at 44 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan felt that courts should judge state searches
on the "more flexible concept of fundamental fairness, of rights basic to a free society, em-
braced in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
86. Id. at 46 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 47-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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exceptions to the rule were created after the passage of the Bill of Rights
and should, therefore, be narrowly tailored to uphold the intent of the fram-
ers. 88 In his explanation, he set out only three circumstances that would jus-
tify unannounced entry: (1) when the person already knows of the officers'
authority and purpose; (2) when the officers have a justifiable belief that the
persons are in imminent peril of bodily harm; and (3) when the persons,
while aware of someone outside, are then engaged in activity that justifies
the officers belief that the person is attempting to escape or destroy evi-
dence.89
At the heart of the Ker opinion is the disagreement about how specific
a showing the Fourth Amendment requires to excuse a failure to knock and
announce.90 The plurality contended that Ker's possession of easily dispos-
able narcotics was a justification for the police's failure to knock and an-
nounce.91 This contention implied that courts and officers could consider
generalizations about drug suspects' tendencies to dispose of drugs as a
basis under the Fourth Amendment for excusing unannounced entries.92 The
plurality, however, did not specifically state that the court could justify
these entries based solely on generalizations.93 Adversely, the Brennan dis-
sent found that the Fourth Amendment allowed justification only by a show-
ing of facts about the individual circumstances that officers could not ex-
plain.94 While listing his three sole exceptions, Justice Brennan felt that the
officers' experience with narcotics suspects did nothing to help make the
exception apply in this case.95 Brennan further explained that the destruction
of evidence exception applied only if there was activity in the suspect's
home at the time of entry that gave the police officers the belief that an at-
tempt to destroy evidence was underway.
96
The Supreme Court's opinion caused serious confusion in state and
federal courts as to how specific a showing was necessary to justify an un-
announced entry by the police.97 Some lower courts began to excuse all
88. Id. at 47-5 1, 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
89. Ker, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Blakey, supra note 65, at
542-43.
90. Adina Schwartz, Homes As Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions on "Knock and Announce," 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545, 553 (1998).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 554.
95. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 61-63 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating "if
police experience in pursuing other narcotics suspects justified an unannounced police intru-
sion into a home, the Fourth Amendment would afford no protection at all").
96. Id. at 47, 61 (Brennan, J, dissenting).
97. See Hemmens, supra note 2, at 573; Schwartz, supra note 90, at 555.
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unannounced entries in drug cases98 while other courts limited their blanket
exceptions to larger drug cases. 99 Still, other courts opted for a more particu-
larized standard, requiring as specific a justification as the Brennan dissent
had required in Ker.'00 Not only did Ker fail to explicitly clarify which stat-
utes, state or federal, were applicable, it also raised new questions about
how the Court would handle drug-related cases.'10
D. A Slightly More Specific Standard: Sabbath v. United States
Four years after Ker, the Supreme Court again dealt with the issue of
knock and announce in the case of Sabbath v. United States. 10 2 In Sabbath, a
federal customs officer apprehended a drug smuggler and persuaded him to
deliver the drugs to Sabbath. 0 3 The officers watched the smuggler enter
Sabbath's apartment and proceeded to knock on the door.'0 Getting no re-
sponse, the officers opened the unlocked door, guns drawn, and entered
without announcement.' °5 The Court held that the federal law enforcement
officers had violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109 by failing to knock and announce
their presence without having a "substantial basis" for the belief that an
announcement was unnecessary. 10 6 The Court based this decision on the
98. As one author described, "A number of courts have recently adopted a blanket rule
allowing police armed with valid search warrants to smash down the front doors of homes
with battering rams and rush inside with guns drawn when the object of the search is drugs
and the home has a toilet." Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 685
(1998).
99. Schwartz, supra note 90, at 555-56. Schwartz's article discusses the differing ap-
proaches, noting that the relaxed particularized approaches imply that announcement may
only be required when officers have reason to believe that a suspect possesses too great a
quantity of drugs to flush. "Thus, in the guise of requiring case-by-case review of the justifi-
ability of unannounced entries, some courts effectively excepted all but the largest drug cases
from knock and announce." Id. at 556-57.
100. Id. at 558.
101. See Hemmens, supra note 2, at 573. Did Justice Clark's plurality opinion mean that
police may forgo the knock and announce requirement for any suspect in possession of easily
flushable drugs? Would the nature of the illegal contraband create the "exigent circum-
stance" without any further showing or would the circumstances need to be so specific that
an exception would never be carved out? See id.
102. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
103. Id. at 586-87.
104. Id. at 587.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 591. Amusingly, the Court calls the issue "uncomplicated" while stating that
certiorari was granted "to consider the somewhat uncomplicated but nonetheless significant
issue of whether the agents' entry was consonant with federal law." Id. at 588.
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federal statute instead of the Fourth Amendment, leaving it unclear whether
state officers had to also meet the new "substantial basis" test.1
0 7
After the Court's previous decisions, there still existed serious conflict
among state and federal courts about the link between the knock and an-
nounce rule and the Constitution. 0 8 The previous decisions'0 9 did not ex-
plicitly clarify whether the Fourth Amendment requires notice or whether
notice is only a statutory requirement.11 The confusion continued until the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the 1995 case of Wilson v. Arkansas "to
resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to whether the common law
knock and announce principle forms a part of the Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness inquiry."'
E. The Constitutional Application in the States: Wilson v. Arkansas
In Wilson, the Court for the first time expressly stated that the common
law knock and announce requirement was a part of the Fourth Amend-
ment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. 12 Although the issue
only arose because of an oddity in Arkansas law, it allowed the Court to
resolve a long-standing conflict among the courts." 3 In Wilson, the police
looked through a screen door, proceeded to open the screen door, and en-
tered the residence while simultaneously identifying themselves as police
officers armed with a warrant. 1 4 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Thomas, looked at the "traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the fram-
ing. ' 15 Justice Thomas further concluded that there was "no doubt that the
reasonableness of a search and seizure may depend in part on whether law
enforcement officers announced their presence and authority prior to enter-
ing."' 16 The Court, however, made sure to say that the requirements were
107. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 574.
108. Id.
109. See supra Part 11.A-C.
110. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 574.
111. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
112. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 576.
113. Schwartz, supra note 90, at 548. Although 18 U.S.C. § 3109 had long required
federal officers to knock and announce, and most states also included a knock and announce
requirement, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Arkansas law contained no knock and
announce requirement. Id. at 548-49. The Arkansas court found that "there is no authority
for Ms. Wilson's theory that the knock and announce principle is required by the Fourth
Amendment." Wilson v. State, 317 Ark. 548, 553, 878 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1994).
114. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929. Upon entry, the officers found marijuana, methampheta-
mine, valium, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun and ammunition. They also found the defendant
in the bathroom flushing marijuana down the toilet. Id.
115. Id.at931.
116. Id. As one author noted, "A fair reading of Wilson suggests that it created a pre-
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not inflexible and that exigent circumstances could justify avoiding the re-
quirements of the general rule." 7 The Court still did not clarify what consti-
tuted exigent circumstances, instead leaving the lower courts the duty of
determining what circumstances would make an unannounced entry reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment. 18
The Court's decision in Wilson did not address the problem of blanket
versus particularized approaches in determining the reasonableness of spe-
cific circumstances necessary to make an unannounced entry, leaving this
area still jumbled to both federal and state courts." 19 Specifically, the Court
failed to rule on the claim that easily disposable drugs is sufficient justifica-
tion for making an unannounced entry.2 0 One commentator described the
exception as threatening to "overwhelm" the rule by overstepping the
bounds of traditional liberties. 121 Most lower courts considered this specula-
tion insufficient to sustain an unannounced entry without exigent circum-
stances known by the officers at the time of the execution of the warrant. 
22
Other courts, like the Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, allowed blanket
exceptions to the general rule.123 In 1997 the United States Supreme Court
ruled on the issue, finally deciding which of these approaches is compatible
with the Fourth Amendment.
124
F. The Final Say on Blanket Approaches: Richards v. Wisconsin
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued the opinion in Wilson, a Wis-
consin defendant, Richards, sought review of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision that a blanket exception applied in drug cases, allowing
police to ignore the knock and announce requirement.1 25 Richards asserted
sumption that notice and announcement are required." Hemmens, supra note 2, at 588.
117. Id. at 934. The Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of
reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores
countervailing law enforcement interests." Id.
118. Id. at 936. "We simply hold that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law enforce-
ment interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry." Id. Justice
Thomas also indicated that some of the common exceptions to knock and announce would
have a good shot at passing constitutional muster in the lower courts. Id. at 935-36. Some
felt that this approach was "unnecessarily cautious" given the amount of case law and statu-
tory provisions discussing exceptions to the requirements of knock and announce. Hemmens,
supra note 2, at 577.
119. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
120. See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 936.
121. Garcia, supra note 98, at 719.
122. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 577.
123. Id. at 577-78.
124. Schwartz, supra note 90, at 559.
125. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
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that the Fourth Amendment's Reasonableness Clause prohibited a blanket
rule, instead requiring a case-by-case determination.126 While the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reasoned that its blanket exception was necessary because of
the "special circumstances of today's drug culture,' ' 127 the United States
Supreme Court objected to this theory, identifying at least two major con-
cerns. 128 First, the exception required "considerable overgeneralization" of
the facts of each case and therefore "impermissibly insulated] these cases
from judicial review."' 29 The second problem with the blanket approach
was that "the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, rela-
tively easily, be applied to others."'130 The Court went on to say that if these
per se exceptions were allowed in every investigation that required some
risk, the knock and announce rule of the Fourth Amendment's reasonable-
ness requirement "would be meaningless."' 31 Instead, the Court, in a
unanimous decision, announced that it is the duty of the court in each case
to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry
justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. 132 The Court
went on to find that, in these "actual circumstances," Richards's recognition
of the officers, along with the easily disposable nature of the drugs justified
the officers' decision to enter unannounced. 133 In sum, although the Court
finally rejected the blanket exceptions to the knock and announce require-
ment, it affirmed Richards's conviction.'
34
After Richards, the exact specifications of entry were still not clear.
The Court's opinion implied that the Constitution did not require exacting
126. State v. Richards, 549 N.W.2d 218, 220 (Wis. 1996).
127. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 393. The court explained that not every drug case would pose the risks of
oicet saftey anxd p~tscyvton of e.Adw t t samt degytt. Id. In, ctrtmix sitxwatvans, th~e
governmental interests may not outweigh the privacy interests intruded upon by an unan-
nounced entry. Id. For example, police could conduct a search when the individuals present
in the residence have no connection with the drugs and would, therefore, be unlikely to
threaten the officers or destroy the evidence. Id.
130. Id. at 393-94.
131. Id. at 394. The court gives the example of armed bank robbers who are by definition
likely to have weapons and the "fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much
difficulty." Id.
132. Id. Interestingly, the Wisconsin law did not even require judicial approval for a no-
knock warrant. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 582. Instead, the police needed no judicial ap-
proval to make an unannounced entry as long as the object they sought was drugs. Id. The
police officers in Richards, however, originally sought a no-knock warrant, but the magis-
trate who signed the warrant struck the portions of the proposed warrant that would have
given the officers permission to make an unannounced entry. Richards, 520 U.S. at 395. The
Court, however, found that this fact did not change the reasonableness of the officers' deci-
sion, "which must be evaluated as of the time they entered the motel room." Id.
133. Richards, 520 U.S. at 396.
134. Id.
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proof;35 instead, officers only needed to have a "reasonable suspicion" that
their announcement would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the inves-
tigation. 36 Richards explicitly states that the showing is not high and that
"felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warrant-
ing a no-knock entry.' 37 The generalizations must be coupled with specific
facts about an entry to establish the reasonableness of a no-knock entry.1
38
Similar to the previous Supreme Court opinions, Richards failed to list
specific facts that would allow the police to forgo the knock and announce
requirement and, similarly, failed to specify the weight that law enforce-
ment should give generalizations about suspects in a case-by-case determi-
nation of reasonableness. 139 Further, the Court did not constitutionalize a
stringent particularized approach, but instead it set what one commentator
has labeled as a "regime of case-by-case review that allows courts to ap-
prove of unannounced entries in virtually all drug cases."'
140
While the Supreme Court has seemed to consistently give deference to
the police, some lower courts were reluctant to do so.14 1 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals took a more "expansive view" of the protections given by
the Fourth Amendment, ruling that the police may avoid the knock and an-
nounce rule when even "mild" exigent circumstances exist, but requiring a
higher showing of exigency to damage property. 42 The United States Su-
preme Court next clarified this issue in United States v. Ramirez.
43
135. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 561. In her article, Schwartz discusses that there is a
"major difference between relaxed and more stringent versions of the particularized ap-
proach" concerning the standard of proof that must be established to show that an exception
to knock and announce applies in a particular case. Id. At the stringent end, she says, some
courts require unambiguous facts that leave no doubt at the time of entry that an announce-
ment would be a useless gesture or that exigent circumstances exist, similar to Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Ker. Id.
136. Richards, 520 U.S. at 394. As the court explains, "This standard-as opposed to a
probable cause requirement-strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law
enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy
interests affected by no-knock entries." Id.
137. Id. at 394. The Court seemed to endorse these generalizations, even citing previous
Supreme Court decisions supporting the claim that these generalizations are indisputable. Id.
at 391 n.2.
138. Id. at 394, 396.
139. Schwartz, supra note 90, at 564. The author suggests that the Court, in repeatedly
stating that unannounced entries are frequently justified in drug cases, suggests that law
enforcement can give generalizations great weight in this determination. Id.
140. Id. at 565-66. As one commentator said, "By requiring only 'reasonable suspicion,'
the Court has insured that law enforcement officers will be able to avoid the knock and an-
nounce rule with ease." Hemmens, supra note 2, at 589.
141. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 589.
142. Id. at 589-90.
143. 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
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G. The Supreme Court Unites for the Reasonableness Standard: United
States v. Ramirez
In 1997 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Rami-
rez to determine whether damage to property resulting from a no-knock
entry requires a higher degree of exigency than any other unannounced en-
try144 In Ramirez, the police were looking for an escaped federal prisoner
who had assaulted an officer. 145 Through information from an informant,
they suspected that the escapee was at the Ramirez house.14 6 The police
were issued a no-knock warrant and proceeded to surround the home.
47
Some forty-five officers then announced their presence while one officer
broke the window of a garage attached to the home, suspecting, based on
the informant, that there were guns in the garage. 
48
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that a
two-tier analysis applied.' 49 The court stated that while a mild exigency is
sufficient to justify an unannounced entry carried out without destruction of
property, "more specific inferences of exigency are necessary when prop-
erty is destroyed."' 50
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court
discussed both Wilson and Richards, saying that neither case addressed the
question of whether property damage determined the lawfulness of an un-
announced entry.' 5' The Court expressly held that it does not, saying that
the general "touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amend-
ment analysis.., governs the method of execution of the warrant" and that
144. Id. at 68. In his article, Hemmens notes that this is the third knock and announce
case the Court has considered in the past three terms, having not accepted one since Sabbath
more than twenty-five years before. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 595. This fact alone, he says,
"indicates the Court is struggling to define the parameters of the rule of announcement." Id.
He blames this struggle in part on the fact that the police have become increasingly more
aggressive in their fight with the "war on drugs." Id.
145. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 68-69.
146. Id. at 68.
147. Id. at 68-69.
148. Id. Awakened by the noise of breaking glass, Ramirez, believing that his home was
being burglarized, retrieved a pistol and fired into the garage. The officers then fired back
and shouted "police." Ramirez then realized that it was the police and surrendered. Id. at 69.
149. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 593.
150. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 69-70. "[The Ninth Circuit] held that this heightened standard
had not been met on the facts of this case." Id. One author noted that the Ninth Circuit's rule
is "well-intentioned, but misses the mark." Hemmens, supra note 2, at 601. Hemmens states
that the focus of the courts should not be on property damaged, but on the amount of infor-
mation the police possess about the "actual, present danger that they face. They should have
probable cause to enter without lnocking and announcing. However, this is a battle that has
already been fought and lost in Richards." Id. (footnote omitted).
151. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 70. The court then says, "It is obvious from their holdings,
however, that it does not." Id. at 70-71.
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the unnecessary destruction of property may violate the Fourth Amendment
while the entry itself is valid.152 In applying these principles, the Court
found that the officers' conduct was "clearly reasonable" given the infor-
mant's information and the violent nature of the suspect and that no Fourth
Amendment violation had occurred. 1
53
The Ramirez opinion also finally clarified the status of the common
law exceptions to the knock and announce rule. 154 Ramirez asserted that the
federal knock and announce statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109,' prohibited the
damaging of property in any circumstances other than those specified in the
statute. 156 The Court, however, disagreed saying, "We remove whatever
doubt may remain on the subject and hold that § 3109 codifies the excep-
tions to the common-law announcement requirement."' 57 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, using Wilson and Richards, that the federal statute in-
cludes an exigent circumstances exception measured by the standard of
"reasonable suspicion," as stated in Richards. 118
H. Where Are We Now?
While one writer has called the knock and announce rule "little more
than an empty promise,"'159 the Supreme Court has clearly tried to balance
law enforcement needs with the rights of individual privacy, although its
efforts have incited much confusion. 60 With the use of the reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has given lower courts a stan-
dard by which to review police entries. With the unclear standard of reason-
ableness, however, courts are faced with a new problem of determining if a
particular situation is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In 2003 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Banks to help lower
152. Id. at 71.
153. Id. at 72. The Court stated, "The police certainly had a 'reasonable suspicion' that
knocking and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or to others." Id.
154. Id. at 73.
155. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
156. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 72.
157. Id. at 73 (stating that if the federal statute codifies the common law, and the com-
mon law informs the Fourth Amendment, the decisions in Wilson and Richards "serve as
guideposts in construing the statute").
158. Id. The Court concluded by saying that the police had met the standard and, there-
fore, § 3109 was not violated. Id. Interestingly, the Supreme Court had previously upheld a
search in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), where the police had damaged prop-
erty. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 599.
159. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 601-02 (noting that a better rule would be one in which
the police must demonstrate, at the time of the entry, that there is probable cause to believe
that one of the common law exceptions to the rule exists).
160. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
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courts determine when it is reasonable for police officers to enter a home
after a proper knock and announcement fails to lead to a peaceful entry. 61
IV. REASONING
In United States v. Banks,162 the United States Supreme Court sought
to clarify how courts should apply the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
Amendment to the length of time police must wait after making their an-
nouncement before entering a residence without permission. 63 After a brief
overview of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision, a unanimous
Court led by Justice Souter' 64 began its analysis by examining the standards
for requiring or dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, ex-
plaining that the same criteria are important in determining when officers
can enter after knocking and announcing. 65 Next, the Court re-examined
both Wilson and Richards by emphasizing the exceptions noted in those
cases and restating their holdings. 66 The Court also discussed the rule taken
from Ramirez, that police may damage premises when necessary if exigent
circumstances are present, without a showing of elevated urgency.167 Lastly,
the Court re-emphasized that the federal statute and the Fourth Amendment
should render the same result in a case-by-case analysis.
168
A. The Court Emphasizes the Case-by-Case Approach
In analyzing the Fourth Amendment's Search and Seizure Clause, the
Court pointed out that the wording is simple, giving nothing specific about
the requirements for the execution of a warrant.' 69 Because of the vagueness
of the Clause, the Court had to "flesh out" an application of the reasonable-
ness standard. 70 In determining how to apply the reasonableness standard,
the Court explained that it had avoided strict categories and "protocols" for
searches, instead treating reasonableness as a "function of the facts of cases
161. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 34. The Court specifically applied this rule to felony cases. Id.
164. Id. at 33-34.
165. Id. at 35 (noting that all parties agreed that the officers were required to and did, in
fact, knock and announce).
166. Id. at 36-37 (noting that a magistrate is within the bounds of the Constitution in
authorizing a no-knock warrant when the warrant applicant gives reasonable grounds to
suspect that an exigency exists).
167. Banks, 540 U.S. at 37 (noting that most people lock their doors, making it common
for an unannounced entry to require some damage). Because the facts of this case focused on
exigency, not futility, the Court focused on exigency alone. Id. at 37.
168. Id. at 42.
169. Id. at 35.
170. Id. at 35-36.
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so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examin-
ing the totality of circumstances in a given case."' 171 The Court emphasized
that forming categories would lessen the significance of details that should
be important in a case while "inflating" less important details. 72 The Court
was quick to point out, however, that there were "factual considerations of
unusual, albeit not dispositive, significance."
' 173
B. The Court Applies Precedent
The Court reviewed both Wilson and Richards, restating that officers
are not obligated to knock and announce when they have a reasonable sus-
picion that the announcement would be dangerous, futile, or lead to the de-
struction of evidence.174 The Court then analogized the circumstances of
this case with the circumstances of Ramirez, noting that the Court based
both cases on the significance of the exigency, shown by the circumstances
known to the officers. 75 The only difference, the Court pointed out, was the
point at which the officers had a reasonable belief that there was a risk of
announcing.1 76 While the officers in Ramirez had a no-knock warrant, where
a judge had previously decided that the announcement would raise a risk,
the officers in this case claimed that the risk of losing evidence arose shortly
after the knock and announcement. 177 While the officers went to the resi-
dence without a reasonable suspicion of facts justifying a no-knock entry,
the Court held that after fifteen to twenty seconds the officers could rea-
sonably have suspected that the drugs would have been destroyed if they
had waited any longer.'
78
Although Banks argued that fifteen to twenty seconds was too brief,
both because he could not hear the officers and because it might have taken
him longer than twenty seconds to answer the door, the Court held that the
inquiry rested on what facts the officers knew at the time of the execution of
the warrant. 179 The Court disposed of the argument that officers should wait
171. Id. at 36.
172. Id.
173. Banks, 540 U.S. at 36. This quote illustrates the lack of specificity, also clearly
shown in Ker, that the Court has continuously used regarding the weight properly given to
factual considerations. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
174. Banks, 540 U.S. at 36.
175. Id. at 37.
176. Id. at 38.
177. Id.
178. Id. The Court also pointed out, however, that it believed this call was a "close one."
Id. The majority cites multiple Courts of Appeals cases that have also held that similar wait
times with similarfacts were reasonable. See id. at 38.
179. Id. at 39-40 (stating that there was no evidence that the officers knew that Banks
was in the shower and unable to answer the door).
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until the occupant has had time to get to the door by saying that the officers
claimed exigency as a basis for entry, making the "crucial fact" the particu-
lar exigency, not the time to reach the door.180 In clarification, the Court
held that the opportunity to dispose of the drugs is what was important,
combined with the execution of the warrant during the day when someone
was likely to be at the residence ready to dispose of the drugs in fifteen to
twenty seconds.)"" The Court explicitly stated that fifteen to twenty seconds
did "not seem [like] an unrealistic guess about the time someone would
need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine." 182 Once the officers
had established an exigency, they were not required to wait any longer be-
fore entering the residence, even if there was damage to the door.'
83
C. Damage to Property as a Factor in Assessing a Reasonable Wait Time
Although the Court explicitly held that the exigent circumstances in
this case warranted damage to property, it was quick to point out that law
enforcement should still consider damage to property in determining a
proper wait time in a case-by-case analysisi?4 In a case where there was no
reason to suspect any immediate risks, the Court said that the reasonable
wait time before forcing entry may be much longer, giving the person more
time to answer the door.'8 ' The need to damage property should be a good
reason for officers to be patient if the circumstances do not warrant ur-
gency. 1
86
The Court next disapproved of the court of appeal's "scheme" that re-
quired enhanced exigency when officers damaged property. 87 The Court
expressly stated that this requirement "was already bad law before the court
10. Banks, 540 U.S. at 40. The Court ethasized that the time would vary with the size
of the residence, from five seconds for a motel room to several minutes for a townhouse. Id.
181. Id. "That is, when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point
of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance,
that governs when the police may reasonably enter." Id. The Court also noted that most pru-
dent drug dealers keep their drugs close to a toilet or kitchen sink for quick disposal. Id.
182. Id. The Court also said that Banks's apartment was small, and a man can walk the
length of an apartment in fifteen seconds. Id. at 40.
183. Id. at 40-41 (stating that there is no reason to treat post-knock exigency differently
than the no-knock exigency in Ramirez).
184. Id. at 41 One reason the Court cited for making officers knock and announce was
the opportunity for the occupant to "save his door." Id.
185. Id. The Court explained that it is difficult to be more precise without making the
reasonable time under the circumstances a rigid set of rules, as the Ninth Circuit had done.
Id.
186. Banks, 540 U.S. at 41. The Court used the example of police seeking a stolen piano.
If police are executing a warrant in search of a piano, they may be able to "spend more time
to make sure they really need the battering ram." Id.
187. Id.
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of appeals decided this case."' 188 The Court also scolded the Ninth Circuit
for ignoring another recent decision in which the Court had disapproved of
a framework that limited officers' consideration of certain factors. 89 The
Court criticized this "categorical scheme" by saying that it threatened the
totality of the circumstances analysis' 90 and that "[a]ttention to cocaine
rocks and pianos tells a lot about the chances of their respective disposal
and its bearing on reasonable time."' 91 The Court said statements like "sig-
nificant amount of time" and "an even more substantial amount of time,"
both used by the court of appeals, "tell very little.' 92
D. The Court Reconciles the Fourth Amendment and Statutory Law
Lastly, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Ramirez that the result
should be the same under a Fourth Amendment and an 18 U.S.C. § 3109,93
analysis. 94 The Court reiterated that the federal statute codifies the common
law knock and announce requirement, as well as the exceptions, that in turn
inform the Fourth Amendment.' 95 The Court again stated that § 3109 con-
taines an exigent circumstances exception requiring refusal after notice, just
as it requires an original announcement.' 96 Therefore, "[a]bsent. exigency,
the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time nec-
essary to infer one."' 197 In this case, the officers had knocked and announced
their presence and entered by force only after their reasonable suspicion of
exigency "had ripened" satisfying both § 3109 and the Fourth Amendment,
even without an actual refusal of admittance. 98 Thus, the Court reversed the
court of appeals's ruling and held in favor of the United States. 199
188. Id. at 42 (citing Ramirez as rejecting this principle and noting that the court of ap-
peals did not cite Ramirez).
189. Id. (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002)).
190. Id. (stating that categorizing threatens the totality of the circumstances principle by
"replacing a stress on revealing facts with resort to pigeonholes").
191. Id.
192. Banks, 540 U.S. at 42.
193. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
194. Banks, 540 U.S. at 42 (permitting an officer to enter by force if, after notice, he is
refused admittance).
195. Id. at 42-43.
196. Id. at 43.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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V. SIGNIFICANCE
As law enforcement faces new challenges involving both the war on
drugs200 and the war on terror, government officials and private citizens
alike are increasingly more likely to find themselves in contentious posi-
tions. With the United States Supreme Court's decisions spanning a half-
century, it has still managed to leave police officers, individuals, and lower
courts with little more than a few examples of what is constitutionally right
and wrong in very particular situations.20 1 Although progress has been
made, especially in elevating the knock and announce requirement from a
common law rule to a fundamental requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
there is still apprehension about how to apply the rule day-to-day, case-by-
case. z°2 While the Court has occasionally told officials what they should not
have done in a particular situation, it has failed to explicitly tell them what
they can routinely do; similarly, the Court has failed to protect the individ-
ual right of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment by allowing ex-
ceptions that sweep so broadly that they can be manipulated by almost any
circumstance. 3
In Banks, the Court applied the exigent circumstance exception to en-
tries where the police had made a knock and announcement. 0 4 Instead of
providing clarification to this confusing exception, the Court made it seem
applicable to almost any situation involving drugs, including one in which a
knock and announcement was originally required.20 5 By doing this, the
Court made it even easier for police officers to avoid the true spirit of the
knock and announce requirement and perhaps even gave officers, at least in
situations involving drugs, incentive to make an original announcement and
then quickly enter anyway.
206
A. The Constitution Does Not Distinguish Between the Individual Rights
of Drug Dealers and Other Americans
Although the Court has not specifically used generalizations about
207
suspects to support an exception to the knock and announce rule, the
200. Arrests for drug law violations in 2005 are expected to exceed the 1,678,192 arrests
in 2003. DRUGSENSE, War on Drugs Clock, at http://www.drugsense.org/wodclock.htm (last
visited March 1, 2005). So far, 270,838 people have been arrested for drug law violations
this year. Id.
201. See supra Part III.
202. See Henmens, supra note 2, at 599-600.
203. See id. at 600.
204. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 37-38.
205. See id. at 39-41; see generally Hemmens, supra note 2, at 600.
206. See Blakey, supra note 65, at 557; see also Hemmens, supra note 2, at 601.
207. See Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
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opinions make it apparent that the court commonly uses generalizations
about drug suspects as a basis for determining that exigent circumstances
exist. In Ker, the Court focused on the easily disposable nature of the drugs
at issue when the police made their unannounced entry, despite the fact that
when the police made their entry Mr. Ker was reading a newspaper, Mrs.
Ker was busy in the kitchen, and the marijuana at issue was in full view on
the kitchen sink, illustrating the "complete unawareness" of the impending
police visit and the low risk of destruction of evidence.2 °8
In Richards, the Court specifically stated that felony drug investiga-
tions would "frequently present circumstances" in which a knock and an-
nouncement would be unnecessary. 209 Although the Court ruled generally in
favor of defendants by disposing of a blanket rule for drug cases, 210 it still
gave sufficient importance to the fact that the suspect was accused of selling
and possessing drugs.21' It seems that the Court has declared a standard of
reasonable suspicion, but has applied it differently based on the defendant in
each particular case. As one author said, "Rhetoric and narrative can enable
a court to profess adherence to the American tradition of individual rights at
the same time as it denies the need to protect criminal defendants or other
outsiders who invoke the people's rights. 21 2 In her article, Adina Schwartz
comments about how the Supreme Court's opinions discuss the differences
in people, rather than the commononalities and, in doing so, it tailors its
decisions to the particular individual seeking the protection rather than up-
holding the traditional legal protections deserved by all.213 All people, there-
fore, suffer because courts have no way to ensure that people receive sub-
214
stantive protection, as opposed to purely formal protections.
In Banks, the officers knocked, waited, and then entered without an
admittance or refusal based on their belief that the suspect was harboring
drugs. 215 Without this belief, there would have been no reason to burst into
the apartment without refusal of admittance. The officers' fear of destruc-
tion of the drugs created the exigent circumstances necessary for officers to
shorten the waiting time and enter promptly.21 6 The Court even stressed the
difference between a piano and cocaine rocks in determining how long offi-
cers must wait before entering. 2 7 The facts of Banks show that the Court
208. Id. at 60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95 (1997).
210. Hemmens, supra note 2, at 600.
211. See generally United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003).
212. Schwartz, supra note 90, at 594.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 39-40.
216. Id. at 38.
217. Id. at 41-42.
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placed great emphasis on the officers' beliefs that drugs were located in the
apartment. The Court added that fifteen to twenty seconds did not seem like
an "unrealistic guess" about the time that someone would need to rid his or
her home of cocaine. 218 Again, the Court inadvertently focused on the in-
volvement of drugs and failed to determine any other reason for entry.
If the Court continues to justify entries, case-by-case, based on the
suspicion that an accused could dispose of the drugs, police intrusion will
threaten the privacy of many citizens' home. 219 By considering fifteen to
twenty seconds a constructive refusal of entry, and the same as a no-knock
entry with exigent circumstances, the Court allows officers to choose be-
tween fighting a no-knock entry in court or making the announcement and
then entering anyway because the defendant was made aware of the police
presence and had disposable drugs.
In Richards, the suspect fled when he realized the police were at his
door, although they had stated that they were maintenance men.221 If the
officers had first announced that they were police officers and then entered
anyway, they could have justified the entry under the ruling in Banks be-
cause the suspect knew the police were outside and he possessed drugs.
Although it seems that the knock and announce requirement protects Fourth
Amendment rights, officers may now, after Banks, use it as a tool to attain
the exigent circumstances necessary for a forceful entry. The Court is allow-
ing entry in any drug-related search almost immediately after announcement
because the officers can create the exigent circumstances necessary for en-
try by making an announcement. If the police officers believe a suspect has
drugs, but make their announcement anyway, they create the exigent cir-
cumstances, suspicion of drugs and knowledge of the officers' presence,
which will exist in any drug-related search. If officers can forcibly enter
seconds after announcing, where is the protection in requiring announce-
ment in the first place?
B. Law Enforcement Concerns With the Supreme Court's Analysis
With the Court's declaration of a case-by-case analysis, it leaves the
decision up to the officers executing a warrant to determine when entry is
legal.221 Police officers, however, have nothing to guide them except the
terms "reasonable suspicion" and the previously decided cases, which illus-
trate that drug possession can easily be cause for entry.22  The United States
219. ld. at 41.
219. See Hemmens, supra note 2, at 601.
220. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1997).
221. Banks, 540 U.S. at 35-36; see also Tor, supra note 59, at 873-74.
222. "[Courts are increasingly displaying a willingness to allow police officers to invade
the privacy rights of citizens if the invasion appears minimal [footnote omitted] and the goal
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit case of Doran v. Eckhold illustrates
the compromising position of law enforcement when implementing the un-
defined knock and announce rule.223 In Doran, a jury returned a two million
dollar verdict against police officers who executed a warrant without first
knocking and announcing, even after the jury found that the lead officer's
shooting of the suspect was reasonable. 224 Although the lead officer made a
determination at the time of the execution of the warrant that the necessary
exigent circumstances existed, the court found as a matter of law that the
facts known to the officers were not sufficient to support a reasonable belief
that the sufficient exigent circumstances existed.225 While police officers
must serve warrants and search homes, they will be reluctant to do so if they
can be held monetarily liable.
Although this issue has not yet reached the United States Supreme
Court, it demonstrates law enforcement's need for a clearer rule that will
protect police officers from two million dollar judgments. While it is diffi-
cult to define a bright line rule that will strike the proper balance between
privacy and law enforcement needs, private citizens and police officers both
226deserve a predictable rule that they can depend on day-by-day.
C. The Arkansas Supreme Court Might Take a Different View
The Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized its authority to impose
greater restrictions on law enforcement activities in Arkansas based upon
state law than what the United States Supreme Court requires under federal
constitutional standards.227 In doing so, the court has held that there are con-
texts in which the Arkansas Supreme Court will provide more protection
laudable. The result has been, in recent years, a major assault on the Fourth Amendment
protections." Hemmens, supra note 2, at 560.
223. Doran v. Eckold, 362 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, No. 03-1810, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 11328 (8th Cir. June 8, 2004).
224. Id. at 1049.
225. Id. at 1053. The police asserted a concern for officer safety "pointing" to the follow-
ing evidence:
an anonymous, uncorroborated tip that the Dorans were buying and making
methamphetamine; the uncorroborated statement that the younger Mr. Doran
had been arrested for illegal firearm possession; the uncorroborated statement
that there were guns in the house; and drug residue in a trash bag found outside
the home.
Id. The court stated that the officers had "relied on very sketchy information, a reliance we
find unreasonable, and outweighed by the privacy interest the Fourth Amendment is meant to
protect." Id.
226. As one author phrased it, "Under the present status of the law, the interest each of us
has in lawful and effective law enforcement is today denied the simple due process require-
ment of an ascertainable standard of conduct." Blakey, supra note 65, at 553-54.
227. Griffin v. State, 347 Ark. 788, 792, 67 S.W.3d 582, 584 (2002).
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under the Arkansas Constitution than federal courts provide under the
Fourth Amendment.228 Further, the court has shown a "longstanding and
steadfast adherence to the sanctity of the home and protection against unrea-
sonable government intrusions., 229 The court has expressed this adherence
multiple times, ruling in favor of privacy of the home over law enforcement
interests.23° Most recently, the court held the law enforcement practice of
"knock and talks"23' unconstitutional under the Arkansas Constitution.232
Although the court did not mandate a particular change in the knock and
talk procedure, it said that the execution of a written consent form expressly
stating that the home owner has the right to refuse consent "undoubtedly
would be the better practice for law enforcement to follow. '233 The court
repeatedly stressed the "rich and compelling" right-to-privacy tradition in
Arkansas, which requires a strict-scrutiny review and a compelling state
interest. 234 The court explained that Arkansas has endorsed this principle
"clearly and unmistakably since the time Arkansas was admitted to state-
hood.5
2 35
The Arkansas Supreme Court has granted protection under the Arkan-
sas Constitution for knock and talks as well as pre-textual arrests. In Sulli-
van v. State, the court noted that while the United States Supreme Court was
"tilting in one direction" in its analysis, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
consistently taken a different direction.236 The court held that, in Arkansas,
"arrests that would not have occurred but for an ulterior investigative mo-
tive" are unreasonable under the Arkansas Constitution and evidence ob-
tained from these arrests should be suppressed. 7
228. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 652, 74 S.W.3d 215, 218 (2002).
229. State v. Brown, No. CR 03-914, 2004 WL 583837, at *4 (Ark. Mar. 25, 2004).
230. See id.; Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647, 74 S.W.3d 215; Griffin, 347 Ark. 788, 67 S.W.3d
582.
231. A knock and talk occurs when:
[several police officers] accost a home dweller on the doorstep of his or her
home and request consent to search the home. If an oral consent is given, the
search proceeds. What is found by police officers may then form the basis for
probable cause to obtain a search warrant and result in the subsequent seizure of
contraband. It is the intimidation effect of multiple police officers appearing on a
home dweller's doorstep, sometimes in uniform and armed, and requesting con-
sent to search without advising the home dweller of his or her right to refuse
consent that presents the constitutional problem.
Brown, 2004 WL 583837, at *3.
232. Id. at *8.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Sullivan, 348 Ark. at 655, 74 S.W.3d at 221 (stating that the position was solidified
based on the Arkansas Constitution and previous court decisions).
237. Id. at 655-56, 74 S.W.3d at 221.
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The Arkansas Supreme Court has shown a willingness to extend pri-
vacy protections beyond the United States Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment rulings. Given the appropriate case, it is a possibility that the
Arkansas Supreme Court might consider extending similar protections be-
yond the federal knock and announce requirements. If the Arkansas Su-
preme Court decides a knock and announce case in the future, it could set
new precedent in Arkansas that is more protective of the sanctity of the
home than past federal court decisions.
D. Conclusion
The positive aspect of the Court's decision in Banks is that there is
now at least some evidence of a reasonable waiting time, fifteen to twenty
seconds. There is still, however, much question over whether that amount of
time is a minimum or a maximum, whether that amount of time is only nec-
essary in felony drug cases or if it also applies to other situations, and
whether the presence of drugs alone wilt pravide the degree of exigency
necessary to enter a home. Until the Court decides many more cases that
provide more insight into the specific circumstances in which the law will
allow entry, police officers, individuals, and lower courts must continue to
try to guess what is reasonable under the circumstances. 238
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238. See Blakey, supra note 65, at 558. "The real question is whether we want to permit
the chaos in law enforcement to continue until the Court has had an opportunity to deal with
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